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ABSTRACT
This paper probes behind the assumptions underpinning the violence 
reduction agendas of the UN and the World Bank: that all forms of 
violence are commensurate and fit neatly into causal models; that 
violence is ‘development in reverse’ and inseparable from state 
fragility; and that security is a self-evident public good. It presents 
a framework to classify global, state and non-state or local violences 
and the interactions amongst them. It suggests that the starting point 
for any evaluation of security as well as violence reduction should be 
the vernacular understandings and day-to-day experience of poor, 
excluded and vulnerable people, including those living at insurgent 
margins.
Whosoever contracts with violence – and every politician does – must live with its specific 
consequences. Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation
1. Introduction
Sustainable development goal 16 (SDG 16) aims to ‘promote peaceful and inclusive societies 
for sustainable development’ and especially to ‘significantly reduce violence and related 
death rates everywhere’. Whilst conspicuously omitting all mention of security, in most other 
respects it echoes an established international consensus that peace and security, develop-
ment and human freedom are indivisible.1 SDG 16s capacious umbrellas conflates a diverse 
menu of policy objectives, including the rule of law and equal access to justice; reduction 
of corruption and of illicit financial and arms flows; effective, accountable and transpar-
ent institutions; responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making; 
access to information and protection of fundamental freedoms; and the strengthening of 
institutions and state capacity to prevent violence and combat terrorism and crime. These 
differ little from the policy priorities spelt out in the World Bank’s influential 2011 Report 
1united nations, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility : Report (2005).
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on Conflict, Security and Development.2 They stem from a shared worldview, in which lib-
eral peace and the curbing of violence are seen as essential preconditions for sustainable 
development.3 This paper investigates behind this consensus to spell out the multiple ways 
violence presents itself and affects security and peace-building. It goes on to argue that 
violence is intimately connected to how states construct security and pursue development. 
Building durable and inclusive peace requires a different view of security, which is rooted in 
the experience and vernacular understandings of the people and groups who are ‘secured’.
2. Beyond linear models of violence and development
A number of assumptions about violence underpin the SDG16 consensus. First that all 
forms of violence are commensurate, such that it makes sense to say that ‘violence’ is on 
the increase or alternatively on the decline, globally and nationally. Second that it can be 
measured and fitted into causal models, on the one hand of its causes or determinants; 
and on the other hand of its developmental and other impacts. Third, that violence by its 
nature unsettles established political and social orders, and is thus inseparable from state 
failure or fragility and also from wider international insecurity. Fourth that violence is the 
polar opposite of security, just as war is the absence of peace. And fifth that violence and 
insecurity can be portrayed as ‘development in reverse’, or to put it the other way around 
security is an essential prerequisite of development.
All of these assumptions are open to question and debate. They tend to share in common 
lack of interest in the specific nature and dynamics of violence itself and its intricate rela-
tionships with political power, domination and inequality. There are many violences, which 
interconnect, yet have their own dynamics and relationships to development, which itself 
is far from linear and imposes costs as well as benefits upon poor and vulnerable people.
Recent analyses of violence have moved from a narrow focus on the causation of civil 
wars, on the motivations of rebels and on the impacts on aggregate indicators of economic 
performance. Instead they tell a more complex multicausal, multi-level story,4 identifying 
significant variations among different forms of violence,5 and analysing how multiple social 
actors engage in, are affected by and respond to these violences. In addition to civil wars, 
a provisional list would include:
•  Globally and regionally networked violence, linked to transnational ideologies, includ-
ing Islamist militancy (ISIS, Boko Haram, Al-Shabaab).
•  Transnationally networked criminal violence linked to commerce in drugs and other 
illicit or high value goods (Central America, West Africa, Afghanistan).
•  One-sided state violence against citizens, especially dissenters and minorities 
(Chechnya, Zimbabwe, Syria).
•  Violence arising in everyday encounters with formal law enforcers (military, police) 
and informal authorities (traditional leaders, urban bosses, drug lords).
2World bank, World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security and Development (Washington, dc: World bank, 2011).
3Oliver P. Richmond, A Post-Liberal Peace, Routledge Studies in Peace and conflict Resolution (london: Routledge, 2011).
4christopher cramer, Civil War is Not a Stupid Thing. Accounting for Violence in Developing Countries (london: Hurst, 
2006) deconstructs established accounts of civil war.
5built into conflict data bases, like that of the armed conflict location and event data Project (acled), which has introduced 
new levels of complexity into the analysis of african conflicts.
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•  Violence subcontracted to paramilitaries, militias and mercenaries in unsecured bor-
derlands (Sudan, Pakistan, Colombia).
•  Natural resource violence linked to youth exclusion, rent-seeking and crime (Niger 
Delta, Sierra Leone, DRC, Colombia)
•  Violence arising from ethnic cleansing, forced migration and human trafficking 
(Balkans, South-East Asia and the Mediterranean).
•  Agrarian revolts and peasant uprisings (Nepal, Peru).
•  Violence in urban spaces, linked to exclusion, lack of services, crime, failures of policing 
(Mumbai, Nairobi, Cape Town).
•  Cycles of electoral and political violence (Kenya, Nigeria, Pakistan).
•  Vigilantism and other forms of community-based or religious enforcement.
•  Rape, domestic violence and homophobic violence, linked to and reinforcing other 
exclusions.
•  Structural or silent violence6 – including marginalisation of those who lack access to 
the means of violence.
Not all these forms of violence fit within accepted definitions of civil war or even violent 
conflict. Some are networked across national and regional boundaries. Many interconnect, 
as with the multiple links between gender-based violence and other forms of violence. Local-
level vigilantism and other community mechanisms for policing behaviour and punishing 
transgressions can create an enabling environment for far wider political and intercommunal 
violence, as in the Central African Republic7 and North-East Nigeria. Conversely, protracted 
state repression may create the conditions in which armed revolt and civil war ultimately 
become more likely, as in Syria and Libya.
Yet, the list is so diverse that one may legitimately question whether all the violences it 
itemises belong within a single frame of analysis. One way of responding to this diversity is 
to narrow down to a specific category of violence, as with Kalyvas’s magisterial analysis of 
violence in civil wars,8 which depicts the complexity and variation even within this major 
category of violent conflicts. Another, adopted here, is on the one hand to focus on the 
defining attributes of violence itself, and on the other hand to spell out variations in how 
these attributes take shape in different political economies, forms of violence production 
and moral narratives.
3. How violence works and for whom; seven propositions
Although much violence is profoundly political it cannot be reduced to ‘politics by other 
means’ as in Clausewitzian or realist accounts of warfare. Nor is it simply ‘economics by other 
means’, as with both Marxist and rational choice analyses of why men to take up arms. The 
point made in the quotation by Max Weber prefacing this article, is that violence is not just 
any other means, it has its own specific characteristics as a form of social action, which also 
entails its own particular ethical burdens. The key to understanding all forms of violence 
6Johan galtung, ‘Violence, Peace, and Peace Research’, Journal of Peace Research 6, no. 3 (1969): 167–91; and Michael 
Watts, Silent Violence: Food, Famine, and Peasantry in Northern Nigeria : With a New Introduction (athens: university 
of georgia Press, 2013).
7louisa lombard and Sylvain batianga-Kinzi, ‘Violence, Popular Punishment, and War in the central african Republic’, African 
Affairs 114, no. 454 (2015): 52–71.
8Stathis n. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (cambridge: cambridge university Press, 2006).
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is that they involve extreme harm or threats of harm. Terror is not confined to terrorism 
but is inherent in all violences. At the same time, as Arendt has pointed out, violence is not 
to be confused with power9; it often makes its appearance when power is weak and public 
authority is contested. It is just as often linked to state-breaking as to state-making. These 
propositions seem almost too obvious to state, yet they have significant implications for 
analysis of violence reduction and for building peace.
First because frameworks for thinking about and controlling violence are neither just 
analytical constructs nor just matters of policy. They are interwoven with moral narratives 
and cultural imaginings. Their discursive framings differ from one historical era and one 
society to another. For much of human history, violence has been tied up with conceptions 
of moral virtue as well as harm, honour as well as fear and outright terror, as in Homer’s 
Iliad, certain Islamic conceptions of jihad or Fanonist glorification of anticolonial violence. 
Conversely peace is an ethical choice, situated within alternative conceptions of culture and 
historical understandings. In the modern world, the terms of moral evaluation appear to 
have shifted decisively against violence, or so influential liberal analyses like Pinker’s The 
Better Angels of our Nature contend.10 Yet whether violence has actually diminished and 
by how much remains disputed.
Moreover, the theory and practice of security and of peacebuilding sits within the same 
discursive domain as that of war and violence. Peace is the apparent antithesis of war; 
peacebuilding aims to reverse cycles of violent conflict; and security offers protection from 
violence and the fear of violence. Both peace and security claim the ethical high ground 
in posing moral as well as practical alternatives to violence. Yet both remain intimately 
connected with violence.
The harm of violence is overwhelmingly physical: killing, maiming, bombing, eviscerat-
ing, beating, raping, torturing, displacement and so forth. It takes aim at bodies, identities 
and boundaries. Yet, the traumas are also psychological, cultural and symbolic. Its impacts 
on the moral economy of power, on the assertion of social hierarchies and on the course 
of social conflicts, depend as much if not more upon on threats, fear and terror, as upon 
direct physical violence itself. It is often argued that ‘structural’ or ‘silent’ violence is as 
disempowering and constraining as direct physical violence; and that development harm 
makes poor and vulnerable people suffer as much as open violence.11 To an extent this is 
so. But it misses the point that physical violence has its own dynamics, and adds its own 
particular contributions to the sum of human suffering.
Second, as Kalyvas argues, the social relations of violence prevailing in times of civil war 
differ fundamentally from those, which prevail in peacetime: ‘War structures choices and 
selects actors in radically different ways than peace – even violent peace.’12 This assertion has 
considerable traction and empirical support. Yet, this paper contends that civil war violence 
should be situated within a broader terrain of violences, including but not confined to civil 
wars. Moreover, although distinct, the social relations of violence mesh in complex ways 
with those in wider capitalist or political marketplaces, which themselves interpenetrate.13
9Hannah arendt, On Violence (San diego, ca: Harcourt brace Jovanovich, 1970), 35–56.
10Steven Pinker, The Better Angels of Our Nature: A History of Violence and Humanity (london: Penguin, 2012).
11galtung, ‘Violence, Peace, and Peace Research’; and Watts, Silent Violence.
12Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 22.
13On the crucial role of political marketplaces in mobilising people and resources for violence see alex de Waal, The Real 
Politics of the Horn of Africa. Money, War and the Business of Power (cambridge: Polity Press, 2015), chap. 2.
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Better understanding is needed of how violence works and for whom, both generally 
and with respect to specific forms of violence. All forms of violence can be understood as 
the outcome of distinctive forms of social production which ‘produce’ and deliver violence 
(and the fear of violence) within particular violent spaces: be these armies, intelligence 
organizations, propagandists, militias, guerrillas, terrorists, warlord followings, mafias, 
gangs, terrorist organizations or mobs. Hoffman’s analysis of West African ‘War Machines’, 
for instance, describes how male bodies are recruited from the reserve army of marginal 
urban youth ‘for efficient deployment in the overlapping service of security and profit’14 in 
rebel fighting groups, local militias and security enterprises. Complex social assemblages 
conjoin those who command the means of violence with capital assets (weapons, logis-
tics, communications, social and symbolic capital) and combatant labour forces or armed 
followings, and enable them to wage war, intimidate, plunder, dominate and protect. It is 
important to analyse how they extract resources, impose costs, spread benefits, control 
bodies, deploy terror, manipulate images, create networks of civilian support and compete 
amongst each other for people, territory and assets.
Third, violence is fraught with uncertainty and violent spaces are inherently volatile. 
Clausewitz talked of the fog of war, but the fog envelops all other forms of violence too. 
In times of conflict, the ability to create uncertainty for others tends to be an important 
source of strategic advantage and of political power. Furthermore, in the political theatres 
of conflict, few clear relationships exist between the resources invested in violence; levels 
of casualty and destruction; and political or economic outcomes. Military analysts refer to 
‘force multipliers’: i.e. the social and political conditions which increase the effectiveness 
of armed violence. Force multipliers can, however, work in both directions, diminishing 
as well as increasing the credibility of violence and of those who use it. One of the major 
lessons of so-called asymmetric conflicts in places like Vietnam, Iraq or Afghanistan is that 
overwhelming force does not necessarily translate into military success, still less security 
and political stability.15 On the other hand, targeted acts of terror can spread ripples of fear 
far out of proportion to the casualties inflicted that spread insecurity, corrode the social 
fabric and undermine public authority, even in stable societies. The current moral panic 
surrounding ‘Islamist’ violence in Europe is a case in point.16
Fourth, and closely related to this uncertainty, are the intricate relationships between 
violence, power in both visible and invisible forms17 and social narratives and imaginaries: 
how violences are imagined, represented and communicated. The ‘shock and awe’ of great 
powers, acts of extreme violence by terrorists, rapes by ethnic militias or killings of activists 
by criminal mafias are all forms of communication, playing upon deeply embedded fears 
of violence. They acquire resonance from the multiple ways in which violence is reinter-
preted in the streets, in political discourse, in popular culture and in the mass media. Acts 
of violence can be considered as speech acts and like all speech acts are open to confusion, 
14danny Hoffman, The War Machines: Young Men and Violence in Sierra Leone and Liberia (durham, nc: duke university 
Press 2011), xii.
15ivan arreguín-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict (cambridge: cambridge university Press, 
2005); and david Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla. Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One (london: c. Hurst & 
co., 2009).
16Fewer people are being killed or maimed by terrorist violence in europe than in the 1970s and 1980s. There is incompa-
rably much ore carnage in afghanistan and the Middle east. nevertheless, terrorism is the lens through which all else is 
interpreted in the West.
17Highlighted by Mcgee in this special issue.
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exaggeration and misunderstanding. Yet at the same time they have their own perverse 
logic, especially for those who deploy them to reinforce or challenge positions of power.
Fifth, are the inherent tensions between violent methods and the political and social 
ends they are meant to serve. Even well-planned humanitarian military interventions can 
go awry or have seriously perverse consequences, still more hasty and poorly conceived 
ones, as in Somalia, Iraq or Libya. Equally, small insurgent minorities (guerrillas, terrorists, 
etc.), which use violence for their own political goals can wreak enormous havoc without 
seriously advancing these goals, or end up instead as predators upon those they have come 
to liberate. Once embarked upon, violence tends to usher in fast-changing processes with 
their own laws of motion, which call forth competing or opposing violences in complex 
political and military marketplaces. Weber’s warning is apt, because the use of violence 
cannot be justified solely by reference to its proclaimed aims, be these protecting security, 
building peace, ensuring social justice or seeking revolutionary transformation. Those who 
deploy violence for whatever cause have to take responsibility for the consequences, which 
may be a far cry from their original goals and include failing states, broken societies and 
appalling human misery.
Sixth, identities and with them boundaries, territorial and social, are bound up both with 
violence and with security or protection from violence. Identities are central to people’s sense 
of selfhood, bodily integrity, well-being and safety. They provide grammatical constructions 
through which people imagine their social worlds, articulate their fears, demarcate their 
security and respond to and sometimes organise for violence.18 At the same time, identities 
are invoked by the powerful; they are written into the structures of nation states; they are 
markers for horizontal inequalities19; and they demarcate hierarchies of citizenship, some-
times violently enforced. In sum, identities form junction points at which state-centred and 
vernacular understandings of violence and security intersect and clash.
But rather than being in any simple sense a ‘cause’ of insecurity and violence in their 
own right, identities are fluid, socially constructed at multiple levels and open to manipu-
lation, especially in conditions of rapid change and insecurity. They are the basis of modern 
nationalism and citizenship, as Anderson argues20; yet are in deep tension with it. National 
citizenship is in principle inclusive in being constructed around equal rights and common 
security. But in practice citizenship can involve various forms of state-sanctioned exclusion: 
against migrants and refugees; against faith groups not subscribing to secular conceptions 
of citizenship; against minorities like Rohingya in Burma, Tamils in Sri Lanka, Hazara in 
Afghanistan, or Sunni Muslims in Iraq, who are seen as less deserving of the protection of 
the state than ethnic, linguistic or religious majorities.
Enloe has analysed how elites in colonial and post-colonial states have securitised eth-
nic and religious identities: to ensure the loyalty of security apparatuses; to define which 
groups can be trusted; and to demarcate those seen as security threats.21 Many authoritarian 
18See benedict anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, rev. ed. (london: 
Verso, 2006); and cynthia H. enloe, Ethnic Soldiers: State Security in Divides Societies (Harmondsworth: Penguin books, 
1980). enloe analyses how security elites use ‘ethnic state security cognitive maps’ to determine which groups are security 
threats.
19Frances Stewart, ed., Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict: Understanding Group Violence in Multiethnic Societies 
(basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); and graham K. brown and arnim langer, ‘Horizontal inequalities and conflict: a 
critical Review and Research agenda’, Conflict, Security & Development 10, no. 1 (2010): 27–55.
20anderson, Imagined Communities.
21enloe, Ethnic Soldiers is as pertinent now as when published in 1980.
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regimes hardwire exclusionary policies into the practice of the state itself. Latent identity 
conflicts remain suppressed until regimes fracture, bringing the fabric of public authority 
into question, as in ex-Yugoslavia, early 1990s Somalia or Libya. Yet exclusionary violence 
also occurs in democracies, like Sri Lanka, India and Northern Ireland, being especially 
oppressive in combination with majoritarian politics discounting the rights and aspirations 
of minorities.22 It can have active champions rooted deep in civil society, be they Buddhist 
monks, Islamic clerics, extreme nationalists or even militant secularists.
Seventh, violence, even subaltern or insurrectionary violence, often reinforces inequali-
ties and is inherently antidemocratic. This may seem a sweeping claim, given that violence 
can tear down as well as prop up social hierarchies and non-democratic political orders. It 
is sometimes said that violence is ‘democratized’ when states lose monopolies of violence in 
situations of social chaos. Yet, this misleads in that power devolves to armed groups, which 
move into the political spaces opened up by these upheavals, as in Iraq and Syria. Even when 
force is used by armed groups with popular support, this is not at all the same as having a 
democratic mandate. What counts in the final analysis is that violence places power, rents 
and control over people in the hands of those controlling the means of violence, whoever 
they may be. Popularly based armed struggles frequently end up centralising power in 
commandist structures, which consolidate new forms of domination and resource control. 
At best they rewrite the rules of inequality and shift its burdens. Even peacebuilding rein-
forces new forms of disempowerment and exploitation if it shirks issues about who controls 
violence and for what purposes.
4. Violence, force and security: a frame for analysis
The analysis above suggests that although forms of violence differ, they share certain shared 
features, and can be placed within a common frame of analysis, spelt out in Table 1.
The Table distinguishes first among the spaces where violence occurs, as well as the social 
agents, including states, who initiate violence within those spaces. Does the violence play out 
in global and regional spaces, networking violence between and around states, as well as other 
transnational actors? Is the violence deployed in national security marketplaces by states and 
political authorities, which assert their monopolies of force so as to protect, or alternatively 
to oppress and exploit their citizens? Are the principle protagonists non-state actors: both 
those posing armed challenges to the state (rebels, militants, criminals etc.); and those pro-
viding the protections neglectful or repressive states are unable to deliver? Or is it primarily 
non-state armed groups and militarily mobilised citizens, who fight over land, resources or 
identities, or endeavour to protect themselves from the actual or feared violence of others? 
These categorizations are not mutually exclusive. Civil wars can encompass state-citizen, 
citizen-state and citizen-citizen violence all at the same time. In the modern world both state 
and non-state violence can be transnationally networked as well as nationally organised.
A second set of distinctions derives from the narratives used to justify the use of violence. 
Is there a ‘legitimate’ or morally defensible narrative, or is the narrative weak or self-serving, 
being used to justify power, revenge or rent extraction. In the real world, the boundaries 
22Robin luckham, anne Marie goetz, and Mary Kaldor, ‘democratic institutions and democratic Politics’ in Can Democracy 
be Designed? The Politics of institutional Choice in Conflict-torn Societies, ed. Sunil bastian and Robin luckham (london: 
Zed books), 37–51.
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between legitimate force and non-legitimate violence are blurred and contested – although 
some forms of violence, like torture, rape or the deliberate targeting of civilians, are impossi-
ble to justify. Much also depends upon who lays claim to the mantle of legitimacy and from 
whom. Positionality is crucial, as both violence itself and protection from violence look 
very different when seen by states and powerful elites; and when experienced by citizens, 
especially those who are vulnerable to day-to-day exclusion and violence.
Whilst problematic, the distinction between legitimate and less legitimate violence is 
worth making. It makes a real difference whether or not violence fits a morally and politi-
cally defensible narrative: if there is a credible case that it maintains peace; supports a just 
cause; does not violate national and international law; upholds legitimate public authority; 
has the assent of citizens; and protects vulnerable people. None of this alters the fact that 
force is inseparable from political power, depends in the last resort upon lethal violence, 
and can easily escalate out of the control of those who use it. But this makes it all the more 
important to unpick the narratives, which justify its use. Are they defensible in principle? 
Are they observed in practice? How if at all are those using force accountable and to whom?
Table 1. ‘legitimate’ force and ‘illegitimate’ violence?
Global and regional State/citizen Citizen/citizen Citizen/state
‘Legitimate’ – claiming 
the mantles of 
security, inclusion and 
justice 
International security National security Security ‘from below’ 
and in the vernacular
Subaltern resistance 
and civil activism
Just war and legitimate 
defence
State protection of 
citizen security
community self-
defence and 
protection
asymmetric peace as 
well as war
Responsibility to 
protect
law, policing and 
public order
local justice and 
policing
civil society activism
Humanitarian 
intervention
‘Security for 
development’
Hybrid or ‘traditional’ 
security provision
Resistance to 
occupation and 
violence
Peace-enforcement 
and peace-building
Stabilization, counter-
insurgency and 
counter-terror
Popular justice and 
vigilantism
Popular (e.g. peasant 
or class) revolts
Peoples’ or national 
liberation wars
‘Illegitimate’ or unjust –  
driven by profit, 
power and exclusion
Hegemonic violence State repression Extractive and 
exclusionary violence
Insurrectionary 
violence
Power projection Human rights 
violations
Vigilante violence Riots, civil unrest, 
electoral violence
corporate and 
privatised security
State-imposed 
redistribution of 
land and resources
Violent appropriation 
of rents, land or 
resources
asymmetric, irregular 
or guerrilla warfare
Proxy, hybrid and 
covert warfare
Subcontracted 
paramilitary and 
militia violence
gender-based violence Violence against 
collaborators and 
class enemies
Military support to 
repressive regimes
armed occupations of 
insurgent margins
identity-based (ethnic, 
religious, sectarian) 
violence
‘extremist’ or jihadi 
violence 
Forcible appropriation 
of resources and 
strategic real estate
State terror and 
politicide
Violence buttressing 
social (e.g. caste or 
class) hierarchies
Terrorism and 
exemplary violence
internationally 
networked criminal 
and terrorist violence
ethnic cleansing and 
genocide
criminal and mafia 
violence
Sectarian and 
genocidal massacres
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Of course the deployment of force itself blurs the boundaries still further, setting up 
distinct historical trajectories of change, which tend then to rearrange the moral compass 
by which the use of violence is guided and evaluated: as when humanitarian interventions 
become tarnished through imperial ventures and new cycles of violence; or when popularly 
supported rebellions morph into coercion and extraction by predatory armed entrepreneurs.
The categorizations of the Table not only provide a way of making sense of the multiple 
forms of violence. They also focus attention on the deep contradictions associated with 
all forms of violence. Powerful states act to preserve international security, build peace 
and support humanitarian objectives; but their efforts to do so are often compromised by 
hegemonic agendas and geopolitical interests. States claim to protect national security and 
preserve law and order, but these may become a cover for the repression and rent extraction 
by political elites. Multiple forms of extractive and exclusionary violence arise in divided 
and unequal societies; but vulnerable communities and groups can devise their own ways 
of protecting themselves from this violence. Subaltern violence often taps deep popular 
discontents arising from inequality and maldevelopment; but these discontents can instead 
be channelled into civic activism and popular resistance.
It was argued earlier that violence tends to be linked to immense asymmetries in power, 
wealth and the means of coercion. But the asymmetries can run in two directions – as when 
insurgents draw upon their greater operational agility, local knowledge and access to social 
media, so as to offset the superior firepower and resources of conventional security forces. 
Arguably there is also scope to build upon such asymmetries in order to resist violence and 
to build peace; and this will be returned to later in this paper.
5. Violence and development: wealth destruction or wealth creation?
The premise of SDG 16 is that violence is not only damaging in itself but is also damaging 
to development. However, the precise nature of the relationships between violence and the 
creative destruction we call development remains open to dispute. It depends on what kind 
of violence; on how it relates on the one hand to the creation of wealth and on the other 
hand to the destruction of wealth; and on how it redistributes assets poverty towards and 
away from insurgent margins. Violence is just as much part of the story of development as 
it is part of the story of underdevelopment. It can arise both when economic accumulation 
takes off; and when it fails.
Mainstream analyses of the development–conflict nexus23 (summarised on the left-hand 
side of Table 2) for the most part adhere to neoliberal paradigms of market oriented devel-
opment. People and groups who engage in violence do so as rational actors responding to 
material opportunities and incentives.24 Development and material progress themselves are 
seen as the most powerful form of conflict prevention. State fragility is regarded as both a 
cause and an outcome of blocked development; and it is also viewed in its own right as a 
major source of political violence.
Conversely, security and public order are considered to be key prerequisites for develop-
ment. Following from this, recent policy analysis has focused on stabilisation programmes 
23Major empirical analyses include Paul collier, et al., Breaking the Conflict Trap. Civil War and Development Policy 
(Washington, dc: World bank and Oxford university Press, 2003); and lars-erik cederman, Kristian Skrede gleditsch, and 
Halvard buhaug, Inequality, Grievances, and Civil War (new York: cambridge university Press, 2013).
24christopher cramer, ‘Homo economicus goes to War: Methodological individualism, Rational choice and the Political 
economy of War’, World Development 30, no. 11 (2002): 1845–64.
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aimed at re-imposing security and on political settlements to establish institutions and create 
durable forms of political order.25 Stabilisation shares some common ground with counterin-
surgency, including the use of development programmes to ‘win hearts and minds’, and thus 
chimes in implicitly with the security agendas of international bodies and global powers.
A more critical stream of analysis26 (summarised on the right-hand side of Table 2) 
not only problematises security but also questions prevailing unilinear notions of market- 
oriented development. It sees violent conflict as inherent in the development enterprise itself, 
arising out of the accumulation strategies pursued by political and economic elites, together 
with their corporate allies and international backers. It entertains the possibility that vio-
lence can be harnessed to the creation as well as the destruction of wealth. It draws upon a 
somewhat different pool of research findings, including detailed ethnographies and historical 
studies, rather than the large-n cross-national statistical studies, which tend to be favoured 
by the mainstream. It harks back to earlier traditions of analysis on structural violence27 by 
focusing on inequality, state violence and globalisation as major determinants of conflict. 
And it focuses less upon state fragility than upon the state itself, notably when its security 
policies are repressive; its development programmes are top-down and extractive; and its 
structures are unresponsive to the needs of citizens, especially the poor and marginalised.
These two paradigms of analysis are not necessarily mutually exclusive.28 Those who 
see market-oriented development as an antidote to violent conflict, for instance, must also 
reckon with its potentially regressive impacts. Critics of the securitisation of development 
can also recognise the need for security policies that try to better understand and control 
for the developmental impacts of security interventions.
Even so the two paradigms imply differing approaches to research and to policy. The 
second in particular highlights the need for a long term historical perspective on how 
varying trajectories of development and of underdevelopment generate violence; which 
understands how different pathways to and from violence in turn reshape the pattern of 
25Sarah collinson, Samir elhawary, and Robert Muggah, ‘States of Fragility: Stabilization and its implications for Humanitarian 
action’, Disasters 34, no. 3 (2010): 275–96.
26Mark duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security (london: Zed books, 
2008); cramer, Civil War Is Not a Stupid Thing; Oliver P. Richmond, Failed Statebuilding: Intervention, the State, and the 
Dynamics of Peace Formation (new Haven, cT: Yale university Press, 2014); and Watts, ‘economies of Violence.’
27galtung, ‘Violence, Peace, and Peace Research’; James c. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance 
(new Haven, cT: Yale university Press, 1985); and Watts, Silent Violence.
28cederman, gleditsch, and buhaug, Inequality, Grievances, and Civil War bridges both traditions of analysis in their sta-
tistical inquiry into civil wars.
Table 2. The development–violence–security nexus: synergistic or contradictory?
Development as violence prevention ‘A violence called development’
conflict is development in reverse conflict interconnects with capital accumulation
conflict destroys social capital conflict is a potential site of innovation
Violence is driven primarily by economic incentives Violence is structural and linked to inequality
War economies distort formal economies War can revitalise informal economies
The developmentisation of security The securitisation of development
State fragility is a major source of insecurity and violent 
conflict
‘Seeing like a state’ is itself a source of maldevelopment, 
inequality and violence
national security and public order are preconditions for 
development
national security consolidates the grip of military, political 
and economic elites
Stabilisation and statebuilding Subaltern resistance and unruly politics 
globalisation encourages both development and security globalisation has a backlash; including networked, 
asymmetric wars
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development, as in Vietnam or Ethiopia, or usher in new cycles of underdevelopment, as 
in DRC or El Salvador. It suggests that policy should concentrate less upon security and 
violence-reduction as ends in themselves; and more upon tackling the inequalities in wealth 
and power that lie at the root of insecurity and violence. It recognises the pitfalls of relying 
upon compromised national elites or international actors to build peace, when they shoul-
der much of the responsibility for violence. And it emphasises the struggles and agency of 
those most exposed to poverty and violence, focused on later in this paper, both in putting 
pressure on decision-makers to respond to their concerns and in creating alternatives to 
violence in their own right.
6. The two faces of security – and of peace
Security, especially state security, tends to be enacted in contexts of the violently contested 
political authority. Often it is enacted through violent power, rebranded as legitimate force. 
Small wonder that some in the development community, including those who drafted 
SDG 16, hesitate to use the word at all. But although security is a deeply disputed idea, it is 
also a highly necessary one. Security functions simultaneously as an analytical construct, 
as a frame for policy and as a moral narrative. It is distinct from the equally ambiguous if 
less contentious concept of peace. Yet, at the same time, it is often seen as essential to the 
preservation of peace.
Most of the things that international decision-makers, political and security elites and 
development practitioners do in security’s name are supposed to protect the safety and 
welfare of people in a world of multiple challenges and threats. However, there is a tendency 
to slide from global, to national, to citizen and to human security and back again, without 
enough serious reflection on how they interconnect and on where tensions and contradic-
tions lie hidden. Development agencies have too often plunged into security policies and 
programmes, without a clear understanding of where they might lead, who would benefit 
and how they might go wrong.
The ambiguities stem in part from a deep-seated tension between two distinct visions of 
security (summarised in Table 3), which interconnect, yet are in deep tension with each-
other. On the one hand, security can be seen as a process of political and social ordering, 
aiming to reduce violence and keep the peace. As such it is territorially organised and kept 
in place globally as well as nationally through the authoritative discourses and practices of 
power, including socially sanctioned violence. It connects to conceptions of what Galtung 
termed ‘negative peace’: the ending of overt violence, without necessarily transforming the 
conditions giving rise to this violence or attending to the quality of the subsequent peace.
In this view security is a public good delivered in principle by states, much like official 
or donor-driven development.29 Yet in a world where states and indeed the international 
order face sustained challenges, security is often kept in place also through alternative non-
state or ‘hybrid’ networks of violence and protection.30 Moreover, security is far from being 
29See the critiques of state-centred development in Scott, Seeing like a State; and James Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine: 
‘Development,’ Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho (Minneapolis: university of Minnesota Press, 1994).
30Volke boege, M. anne brown, and Kevin P. clements, ‘Hybrid Political Orders, not Fragile States’, Peace Review 21, no. 1 
(2009): 13–21; Roger Mac ginty, ‘Hybrid Peace: The interaction between Top-down and bottom-up Peace’, Security Dialogue 
41, no. 4 (2010): 391–412; and Robin luckham and Tom Kirk, ‘understanding Security in the Vernacular in Hybrid Political 
contexts: a critical Survey’, Conflict, Security & Development 13, no. 3 (2013): 339–59.
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an unalloyed public good. In principle, it is equally shared and socially inclusive, even if 
in practice it is anything but, especially at the insurgent margins where insecurity is most 
acute. For in practice it protects socially embedded power, established property relations 
and social privilege – and reinforces global, national and local inequalities.
On the other hand, security can be seen (in the vernacular) as an entitlement of citizens 
and more widely human beings to social peace and protection from violence, abuses of 
rights and social injustice, along with other existential risks such as famine or disease. It 
connects to the idea of ‘positive peace’, including transformations in the social conditions 
giving rise to violence and deepening the relationships between states and their citizens.
The vernacular understandings, day-to-day experience, resilience and agency of the 
people and groups who are ‘secured’ and ‘developed’ are in this view the touchstone by 
which to evaluate security and violence reduction. Most people fall back upon their social 
identities – as women and men, members of families, clans, castes, ethnic groups, sects, 
religions and nationalities – to navigate their social worlds, to respond to insecurity and 
violence and (sometimes) to organise for violence. At the same time, these identities are 
written into the structures of power and inequality, being deployed to establish hierarchies 
of citizenship and patterns of exclusion. Ensuring that security is inclusive and not simply 
the security of particular groups or the property of the well-armed, powerful and wealthy, 
is fraught with difficulty and must be negotiated at multiple levels.
‘Security in the vernacular’ is the term used here rather than the interlinked but distinct 
concepts of ‘human security’ and of ‘citizen security’ popularised by the United Nations 
Table 3. The two faces of security and peace: necessary but highly contested concepts.
aScott, Seeing like a State.
bnils bubandt, ‘Vernacular Security: The Politics of Feeling Safe in global, national and local Worlds’, Security Dialogue 
36, no. 3 (2005): 275–96; lee Jarvis and Michael lister, ‘Vernacular Securities and Their Study: a Qualitative analysis and 
Research agenda’, International Relations 27, no. 2 (2013): 158–79; and luckham and Kirk, ‘understanding Security in the 
Vernacular in Hybrid Political contexts.’
cJames Ferguson, ‘Seeing like an Oil company: Space, Security, and global capital in neoliberal africa’, American Anthro-
pologist 107, no. 3 (2005): 377–82.
‘Seeing like a state’a ‘Security in the vernacular’b
Security as political and social ordering maintained through 
authoritative discourses and practices of power
Security as an entitlement of human beings to protection 
from violence and other existential risks
‘negative peace’. Halting violence rather than changing the 
conditions giving rise to it
‘Positive peace’, conflict-transformation and peacebuild-
ing from below
Political power, legitimate violence and public authority are 
of the essence, globally as well as nationally
Security intertwines with other entitlements, including 
freedom from hunger and disease, protection from 
environmental hazards, etc.
Security is territorially bounded within states, regions, 
urban spaces, local communities
Security is ontological and tied to the construction of 
identities and of imagined communities
capable and accountable state and local institutions, nota-
bly security and justice institutions
Rights, legitimacy and consent are central; the state is the 
problem as much as the solution
‘Seeing like a corporation’c; stabilising existing distributions 
of power and prosperity
addressing conditions creating insecurity, including bad 
governance and social exclusion
inequality, including unequal security, is inherent Social and political inclusion, in terms of gender, class, 
faiths and minorities
both states and the international community have a 
‘responsibility to protect’: but how and to whom are they 
accountable?
Who speaks security and to whom? The voices and agency 
of the poor, vulnerable, marginalised and oppressed
collective action initiated by national and international 
elites
Security from below. Subaltern politics, social movements 
and civil society
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Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank,31 which fit in the conceptual tool-
boxes of development practitioners, humanitarian agencies and intervention forces. Both 
human and citizen security have come under criticism for ‘securitising’ development by 
framing poverty, exclusion and vulnerability through security lenses, and thus paving the 
way for military interventions in the affairs of fragile states.32 ‘Security in the vernacular’ 
paves the way for more precise and detailed empirical scrutiny of how security and plays 
out in particular local and national contexts. It highlights the experience and social agency 
of those who are ‘secured’. And it underscores the transformative potential of security as 
an entitlement, which can be actively claimed by those who challenge the deeply rooted 
legacies of insecurity, exclusion and injustice.
Both these faces of security have their underside, most obviously the first. ‘Seeing like a 
state’ even with the best of intentions can lead to the interests of citizens being sacrificed to 
an unbending vision of national security or of top-down development (as even in Nyerere’s 
Tanzania).33 It is also open to abuse – for instance, to prop up authoritarian regimes; to 
advance the interests of predatory elites; to impose exclusionary economic and social pol-
icies; to justify state secrecy and surveillance of citizens; or to justify the hegemonies and 
military adventurism of major world powers. And it tends to be closely if complexly related 
to ‘seeing like a corporation’, most obviously in enclave economies, where privatised security 
arrangements in protected enclaves may indeed destabilise or weaken the state.34
The deformations of security in the vernacular tend to be more hidden, but no less dam-
aging – for instance, the submission of minorities and refugees to campaigns of exclusion 
and violence by populist majorities; forms of popular justice that violate the rights, dignity 
and safety of supposed perpetrators; or grass roots endorsement of ‘traditional’ or customary 
institutions, which perpetuate gender and other inequities. Moreover, local-level insecurities 
can persist or even worsen, when a state, like India or Brazil, is considered to be stable, or 
a region or locality is considered to be secure.
Neither face of security can be considered without the other. The relationship between 
them is utterly crucial. The capacity of states to protect their citizens is at the basis of the 
social contract.35 That is, the rights and security of citizens and people are the bedrock of 
state and international security – or at least they should be. But these entitlements cannot 
be protected without some kind of social order, however achieved. And how and by whom 
social order is assured are both affairs of governance and vital concerns for everyone who 
lives under the leaky umbrella of political authority.
Political stability, durable institutions, the rule of law, and effective and accountable 
security apparatuses are not just desirable attributes of states but are also in many respects 
conditions of the security of people. However, they come at a price, not just in taxes, but 
also because of the need for constant vigilance to ensure that those charged with delivering 
31On human security see Roland Paris, ‘Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot air?’, International Security 26, no. 6 (2001): 
87–102; and Richard Jolly and deepayan basu Ray, ‘Human Security – national Perspectives and global agendas: insights 
from national Human development Reports’, Journal of International Development 19, no. 4 (2007): 457–72. The World 
bank’s ‘World development Report 2011’ refers to citizen rather than security. although used almost interchangeably, 
human security and citizen security are not the same, as the barriers erected against refugees fleeing violence in Syria 
and elsewhere remind us.
32duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars; and Watts, ‘economies of Violence’.
33Scott, Seeing like a State. Tanzania’s disastrous villagisation policy is one of Scott’s most telling examples.
34Ferguson, ‘Seeing like an Oil company’ argues that corporate security in enclave economies is not only compatible with 
weak statehood, but contributes to it.
35david K. leonard, ‘Social contracts, networks and Security in Tropical africa conflict States: an Overview’, IDS Bulletin 44, 
no. 1 (2013): 1–14.
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security do not ignore or still worse violate the entitlements of those they are supposed to 
protect.
In principle, the gap between security demand and security supply is mediated in the 
political marketplaces of democracy. But these political marketplaces are highly imperfect, 
even in the so-called advanced democracies, and democratic accountability hardly ever 
extends beyond national boundaries. International agencies and donors promote security 
sector reform programmes in post-conflict and transitional countries precisely in order 
to bring down their democratic deficits. Yet, this tends to be a task of Sisyphus where the 
currencies of power are patronage, corruption and outright violence,36 which both suborn 
and bypass the state and its formal security institutions. Moreover, it is not as if donors 
themselves are in any way accountable to those they are supposed to be delivering from 
poverty and violence. The democratic deficits of donor agencies along with international 
institutions, global corporations, major powers, peacekeepers and international NGOs are 
vast, but seldom discussed.37
7. The challenges of rethinking violence and security in the vernacular
It is not enough simply to assert that security should be turned on its head and looked at 
from the viewpoint of the people who are secured, including those beyond the vanishing 
point of officially delivered security?38 How ordinary people themselves define, experience 
and try to ensure their own security must be foregrounded. The World Bank’s study Voices 
of the Poor identifies personal safety and security as amongst the pressing concerns of poor 
people,39 and argues that they themselves are the true experts in poverty.
‘Security in the vernacular’ emphasises that those who are vulnerable and insecure are 
not just social categories but people, groups and communities, who perceive, cope with and 
respond to violence in ways that differ, sometimes radically, not only from the dominant 
state security narratives, but sometimes also from universal conceptions of human and 
citizen security. In Egypt, the words amn and amaan are both used to denote security. The 
latter includes notions of personal safety, which extend beyond conventional definitions 
of security. A recent study by Tadros40 found it was used to cover at least nine different 
forms of security, amongst them security from state retribution and violence; absence of 
identity-based exclusion and discrimination; freedom from sexual harassment; everyday 
safety from criminal and terrorist violence; and hopes for the future including improved 
relationships among the country’s different faith communities. Absence of law and order, 
with the state described as ‘al dawla mekhala’a’ (‘disjointed like a piece of broken furniture’) 
during recent upheavals, was a central fear expressed by many of those interviewed.
Security is a central concern even for those who see the state and its security and justice 
agencies as remote from day-to-day concerns, or who actively avoid them because they are 
36alex de Waal, ‘Mission without end? Peacekeeping in the african Political Marketplace’, International Affairs 85, no. 1 
(2009): 99–113.
37Severine autesserre, Peaceland. Conflict Resolution and the Everyday Politics of International Intervention (cambridge: 
cambridge university Press, 2014.
38carolyn nordstrom, ‘Women, economy, War’, International Review If the Red Cross 92, no. 877 (2010): 161–76 argues that 
such vanishing points render many people (notably women) invisible and unrepresented.
39deepa narayan et al., Voices of the Poor: Crying Out for Change (Oxford: OuP/World bank, 1996), 2.
40Mariz Tadros, Decrypting Copts’ Perspectives on Communal Realtions in Contemporary Egypt through Vernacular Politics 
(2013–2014) (brighton: idS, 2015).
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seen as an oppressive presence. This is well captured in the language used by marginalised 
women labourers and sex workers in South Kivu when they said ‘“hawatuoni sisi wafupi”, 
that they (big men, powerful people), don’t “see” us short people (the impoverished mar-
ginalised populations)’.41
The security landscape of ‘short people’ tends to be inhabited not only by agents of state 
security, but also by powerful employers of their labour and many other actors. Some of 
these actors operate beyond the margins of state authority or indeed are violently opposed 
to it: warlords, religious militants, guerrillas, paramilitaries, mafias, vigilantes, traditional 
authorities, secret societies, community protection bodies and many others. Security along 
with justice and public authority is often negotiated outside the state rather than within 
it,42 and includes various forms of hybrid security provision in which state and non-state 
security providers interact and may be hard to tell apart.43 This is the day-to-day reality, 
which great numbers of people have to live with, often at some cost to their own personal 
safety, rights and welfare.
Indeed, there is a veritable cacophony of vernaculars, strung together by shared threads 
of history and webs of identity. A major challenge for researchers and policy-makers alike 
is how to listen and respond to the many ways people navigate the terrains of violence and 
envision their own security.44 They can draw upon a more extensive and diverse array of 
empirical research than was available two or three decades ago, ranging from investigations 
based upon participant observation and action research to quantitative time series analyses 
drawing on livelihood and household surveys detailing how violence affects everyday lives.45 
A range of in-depth ethnographies and local histories detail how particular groups navigate 
the terrains of war and peace. They include studies of child soldiers, urban youths, women 
combatants, ‘bush wives’ and camp-followers; of refugees, displaced people and marginal-
ised communities; of residents in urban neighbourhoods coping with gangs, drug dealing 
and ethnic or religious violence; of rebels, irregulars and ex-combatants; of vigilantes and 
informal, non-state policing and justice bodies.46
Making sense of these diverse streams of research poses multiple challenges. First, the 
difficulty of triangulating findings from studies, which take different methodological routes, 
are of varying rigour, and address different analytical and policy concerns.47 Vernacular 
narratives are replete with their own biases, elisions and erasures. The many studies of 
41Jocelyn T.d. Kelly, aleandria King-close, and Rachel Perks, ‘Resources and Resourcefulness: Roles, Opportunities and Risks 
for Women Working at artisanal Mines in South Kivu, democratic Republic of the congo’, Futures 62 (2014): 95–105.
42Tobias Hagmann and didier Péclard, ‘negotiating Statehood: dynamics of Power and domination in africa’, Development 
and Change 41, no. 4 (2010): 539–62.
43niagale bagayoko, eboe Hutchful, and Robin luckham, ‘Hybrid Security governance in africa: Rethinking the Foundations of 
Security, Justice and legitimate Public authority’, Conflict, Security & Development 16, no. 1 (2016): 1–32; Kate Meagher, 
‘The Strength of Weak States? non-State Security Forces and Hybrid governance in africa’, Development and Change 
43, no. 5 (2012): 1073–101 highlights the potentially violent and discriminatory aspects of non-state security provision.
44Henrik Vigh, Navigating Terrains of War: Youth and Soldiering in Guinea Bissau (new York: berghahn books, 2007); and 
luckham and Kirk, ‘understanding Security in the Vernacular in Hybrid Political contexts’.
45Particia Justino, Tilman brück, and Philip Verwimp, eds., A Micro-level Perspective on the Dynamics of Conflict, Violence 
and Development (Oxford: Oxford university Press, 2013) challenge the assumption that large-n quantitative research is 
not possible in conflict-affected or insecure environments.
46among the more notable are Paul Richards, Fighting for the Rain Forest: War, Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone, (london: 
international african institute and James currey, 2008); carolyn nordstrom, A Different Kind of War Story (Philadelphia: 
university of Pennsylvania Press 1997); Koen Vlassenroot and Timothy Raeymaekers, Conflict and Transformation in the 
Eastern DRC (gent: academia Press, 2004); Vigh, Navigating Terrains of War; chris coulter, Bush Wives and Girl Soldiers: 
Women’s Lives through War and Peace in Sierra Leone (ithaca, nY: cornell university Press, 2009); and Hoffman, The 
War Machines.
47as discussed in Rosemary Mcgee and Jenny Pearce, eds., ‘Violence, Social action and Research’, IDS Bulletin 4, no. 3 (2009).
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ex-combatants, rebels and other participants in violence provide insights into why (mostly) 
men rebel and how they can be demobilised. Yet, they privilege their viewpoint and may 
divert post-conflict funding from those who have not engaged in violence. The narratives of 
those most marginalised – for example, submerged minorities, victims of sexual violence, 
and women carers who have assumed the burdens of looking after the injured, sick, elderly 
and displaced – tend to be harder to trace, all the more when silenced by violence itself.
One must also reckon with the political and social biases of popular framings of secu-
rity. Repressive national security policies or mano dura policing methods sometimes enjoy 
wide popular support, especially in conditions of political upheaval as in Egypt, or criminal 
violence as in parts of Latin America. Popular policing of religious morality and lifestyle, be 
it by Islamist hisba or charismatic churches, sometimes reinforce state-approved curbs on 
the rights of women and intolerance of ‘deviant’ sexuality. Popular prejudices and religious 
bigotry intertwine in assaults on the bodies, homes and livelihoods of minorities like the 
Yezidi in Iraq, Hazara in Afghanistan, or Rohingya in Myanmar. Deep-rooted conceptions 
of popular justice based on exemplary punishment of offenders can convert vigilantism 
into political violence when social order disintegrates, as in the Central African Republic.48
Analyses of how ordinary people understand security need to uncover the ‘hidden tran-
scripts’ of those facing poverty, exploitation and violence.49 Often they have a better grasp 
of their own situation than is commonly supposed. A case in point is the sex workers and 
other women working in and around artisanal mines in South Kivu referred to earlier, who 
formed the Association of Free Women, which helped them to gain access to health care, to 
withstand financial shocks and to receive social support from their peers.50 Some margin-
alised groups, such as disenfranchised urban and rural youths in Nigeria, have channelled 
energies into more explicitly ‘insurgent constructions’ (within ethnic militias, area boy 
associations, Yandaba, secret societies, cult groups and in a particularly violent form Boko 
Haram), which challenge yet may also reflect a corrupt public realm.51
Local knowledge is at the core of security in the vernacular. National and international 
policy-makers ignore it at their peril. Abramowitz has argued52 in regard to the Ebola 
outbreak in West Africa that deep local understanding is needed for many reasons: to 
improve baseline data, including counting of the dead; to draw on actionable local ideas, 
for example about burial methods; to tap local initiatives and capabilities; and to render 
visible the invisible power relations constraining or facilitating collective action to contain 
outbreaks. Similar reasoning applies to security and justice provision, where local ownership 
and community-led initiatives are prioritised, but tend to remain unimplemented in the 
absence of sound understanding of local contexts.
Yet by itself vernacular understanding is not enough. Whilst the dramas of insecurity and 
violence play out at grass roots, they are also shaped by hierarchies of power, by political 
marketplaces and by economic transactions extending far beyond the local level. However, 
there is a wide gap in our understanding of how local, national and global insecurities 
48lombard and batianga-Kinzi, ‘Violence, Popular Punishment, and War in the central african Republic’.
49James c. Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts (new Haven, cT: Yale university Press, 1990).
50Kelly, King-close, and Perks, ‘Resources and Resourcefulness’.
51charles gore and david Pratten, ‘The Politics of Plunder: The Rhetorics of Order and disorder in Southern nigeria’, African 
Affairs 102, no. 407 (2003): 211–40. On boko Haram see dowd and drury in this special issue.
52Sharon abramowitz, ‘Ten Things anthropologists can do to Fight the West african ebola epidemic’, 2015 http//somatoshpere.
net/2014/09/ten-things-that-anthropologists-can-do-to-fight-the-west-african-ebolaepidemic.html.; and a. Wilkinson and 
M. leach, ‘briefing: ebola-Myths, Realities, and Structural Violence’, African Affairs 114, no. 454 (2015): 136–48.
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interconnect. Little of the research on the macro-level determinants of insecurity, such as 
natural resource dependence, poor governance, or the commerce in small arms and drugs, 
spells out their impacts on the lives of vulnerable people. Conversely, little of the micro-level 
research on how people are affected by and respond to insecurity traces the causal connec-
tions and lines of accountability back up to the national, still less regional and global levels.
In the gaps between these levels of explanation, it is easy for what Autesserre calls ‘dan-
gerous narratives’ to flourish.53 On the one hand, these include causal stories elevating some 
global determinants of violence, like conflicts over natural resources, over others, which 
may be more directly relevant in specific national and local circumstances. On the other 
hand, they incorporate narratives, which privilege the plight of particular sets of victims, for 
instance the victims of sexual violence, over the determinants of the violence from which 
all suffer. Her point is not that either of these narratives is wrong. Rather it is that they are 
prioritised by international analysts and practitioners without serious empirical interroga-
tion of how they play out in particular national and local contexts and of who is most at risk.
Relatively few studies spell out the empirical connections between local and national 
sources of violence. Even fewer investigate local–global or local–national–global intercon-
nections.54 There is an apparent drought of participatory or ethnographic research linking 
insecurity in ordinary people’s lives to the global shifts which shape it. However, a handful 
of studies link local histories of conflict and insecurity to their national and global historical 
settings. Chauveau and Richards, for instance, trace back divergent motivations of fighters 
in the civil wars in two specific regions in Côte d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone to varying trajec-
tories of agrarian change during the colonial and post-colonial periods, which in one case 
involved reliance upon migrant labour and in the other case created an excluded agrarian 
underclass.55
At the same time, those most at risk from poverty and everyday insecurity are often 
themselves well aware that their situation hangs on events and social forces far beyond 
their reach. Especially so in a world in which the new media extend far and wide: to the 
legendary ‘Arab street’; to urban youths and social activists; to local elites and disaffected 
young people in small towns and remote villages; and also to the religious militants, armed 
insurgents and criminal elements exploiting the vulnerability of such groups.
Yet rarely do they have the information and analytical tools that would enable them to 
make sense of these remote determinants of their insecurities. Access to information and 
capacity to press for change is mediated by many gatekeepers, including national and local 
elites, intelligence and propaganda apparatuses, media outlets, the rumour mills of populist 
politicians, the sermons and pronouncements of clerics, imams and religious militants, the 
blogs and postings of social activists, as well as the political theatre of the advocates of terror 
and violence. Very few of these interlocutors can be relied upon; often they frame insecurity 
through biased lenses; and seldom are they in any way accountable.
53Severine autesserre, ‘dangerous Tales: dominant narratives on the congo and their unintended consequences’, African 
Affairs 111, no. 443 (2012): 202–22.
54Robin luckham, ‘introduction: Transforming Security and development in an unequal World’, IDS Bulletin 40, no. 2 (2009): 
1–10; Jana Honke and Markus-Michael Muller, ‘governing (in)security in a Postcolonial World: Transnational entanglements 
and the Worldliness of “local” Practice’, Security Dialogue 43, no. 5 (2012): 383–401.
55Jean-Pierre chauveau and Paul Richards, ‘West african insurgencies in agrarian Perspective: côte d’ivoire and Sierra leone 
compared’, Journal of Agrarian Change 8, no. 4 (2008): 515–52.).
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8. Conclusions: building peace in unequal societies
The thrust of the analysis above is that the forms of violence are multiple and their laws of 
motion complex. For this reason, turning SDG 16s goal of reducing violence into practi-
cal peacebuilding poses immense problems. The starting point should be the vernacular 
understandings of those most affected by violent conflict. They are by no means passive 
cyphers in the dramas of violence war, peace and security. Only by listening to them can the 
grip of dominant state and security-centred paradigms over analysis and policy be broken.
Yet, the vernacular understandings and agency of local people by themselves can only 
take us so far. Ensuring that they make a significant impact on peacebuilding is both an 
analytical and a political task. A multi-level approach is essential in order to track the causal 
trails from local-level conflicts and insecurities to their wider national, regional and global 
determinants. But at some point these causal trails tend to run out or to become overde-
termined by the multiplicity of explanatory factors at each level. It is notoriously difficult 
to shift register between different geographical and analytical scales. It does not help that 
there are so few empirical studies making the interconnections.
The best one can do meanwhile is to carry out rough and ready mental experiments as 
reality checks. For instance, what would need to change nationally and globally as well as 
locally to better protect women who service the needs of men in Congolese mining villages; 
or members of Somali-speaking communities caught between al-Shabaab militants and 
brutal counterinsurgency? How can members of local communities navigate their way 
through criminal and paramilitary violence, as in Buenaventura, Colombia, in such a way 
as to connect with national peacebuilding and break the links to the global markets, which 
fund the violence? What needs to change for humanitarian interventions under the banner 
of the ‘responsibility to protect’ to reinforce local security provision and protect vulnerable 
people in countries like Afghanistan or South Sudan, rather than making them even more 
insecure? Posing such questions, even when lacking the evidence to answer them, points 
up what still needs to be understood, as well as what still needs to be done.
Lessons can also be learned for peacebuilding from the ample yet problematic policy 
literature on counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism strategies.56 Whilst these strategies 
have not been a central concern of this paper, they draw upon two insights which are con-
sistent with the analysis above and are pertinent to peacebuilding. First, neither insurgent 
nor counter-insurgent violence can succeed without the active or at the very least passive 
support of significant sections of the civilian population. Second, although state and non-
state violence mutually interconnect, they are asymmetric. That is, they are constructed 
around different ways of deploying and mobilising people and resources for violence, in 
which those who command superior resources and firepower do not necessarily come out 
on top.
Peacebuilding too can pioneer asymmetric approaches, by moving beyond standard 
policy instruments of stabilization and state-building, so as to tap popular resistance to all 
forms of violence, including those perpetrated by the state.57 Resisting violence is not the 
same as simply avoiding it, or as retreating from the social arenas in which it occurs. Such 
resistance can only work if based upon sound understanding of how violence is organised 
and used in the service of power down to the most local levels. The weapons of the weak 
56a sophisticated example by the co-author of uS counterinsurgency doctrine is Kilcullen, Accidental Guerrilla.
57See Mcgee in this special issue.
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include not just the capacity to ignore, work around or resist demands made by the pow-
erful. They require also active strategies to mobilise political alliances and social networks 
that can challenge both violence itself and the armed and powerful groups, which deploy it.
But even such an approach to peacebuilding poses issues of positionality. The question 
‘whose peace?’ cannot be shirked. In principle, peacebuilding should be a positive sum game, 
which transforms security dilemmas in which one group’s cohesion and safety becomes 
another’s exclusion and insecurity. But precisely how and by what processes remains the 
issue in societies characterised by profound hierarchies of citizenship, in which identities 
are woven deep into existing structures of power and wealth and are hardened in the fur-
nace of violence itself.
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